On behalf of spore gods. ALASDAIR RICHMOND This paper argues that applying ideas from (especially) general relativity can support interesting theses about death and its harm advanced by Roy Sorensen. In particular, if we look at our own personal time through the lens of certain relativistic spacetimes, we find coherent models for some apparently very counter-intuitive lives, but lives whose possibility can nonetheless shed light on whence death gets its harm and that could, for all we currently know, be actual. Sorensen (2005) tackles death's harm via Lewis (1976: 145) on time travel (TT):
Inevitably, [TT] involves discrepancy between time and time. Any traveler departs and then arrives at his destination; the time elapsed from departure to arrival (positive, or perhaps zero) is the duration of the journey. But if he is a time traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does not equal the duration of the journey. ii) A journey is BTT if Xt is ever negative, i.e. not just if overall Xt is negative. 2 However, Lewis makes some resistible claims.
First, Lewis (1976: 146) parenthetically suggests BTT includes (Pt > Xt > 0) cases. This seems uncompelling:
such Pt runs fast compared to Xt but stays future-directed nonetheless. Secondly, Lewis (ibid.) says Xt is 'time itself' while Pt 'isn't really time, but it plays the role in [a traveller 's] life that time plays in the life of a common person'. Xt is 'genuine time' to Nowacki (2006: 84) . Sorensen (2005: 122) says Pt is 'a time-like relation that can govern vast portions of the universe'. Such glosses can mislead. Far better, Bernstein (2015: 160) glosses Xt as 'time on the "normal" forward-evolving timeline'.
Relativity knows no absolute 'time itself' but allows TT: duration differs between reference-frames but no frame is ontologically privileged. Pt too is 'genuine time'.
Cf. Horwich (1975: 433) on a (500-year Xt: 15-minute ) relativistic time-journey:
Giving up the notion of absolute time and relativizing time to frames of reference allows us to view the 500 years of earth-time and the 15 minutes of the proper-time of the time machine as equally good and correct measures of the temporal difference between the year 2500 and the departure of the time machine.
Pt and Xt have frame-relative durations but are not thereby subjective, illusory or derivative. Pace Lewis, non-absolute (relativistic) time allows TT: 'The temporal interval that is traversed and the duration of the journey are measured in different frames of reference', (Horwich 1975: 433) .
While -values are absolute, considerations like mass-energy distribution make some -values more salient as Xt or Pt. Taking as Xt the  of a cosmic ray approaching Earth at 0.999 c is a possible but impractical choice. For astronauts passing (e.g.) the galaxy Andromeda, time proper to Andromeda's mean centre of motion is plausibly Xt. As Andromeda moves relative to its local galactic cluster, 3 the astronauts' Xt is a still bigger frame's Pt.
Unlike duration,  and causal order are invariants. (Causal structure and  remain absolute even in BTT.) Adapting Lewis (1976) to relativity means 'whether or not something is a time traveller should vary from frame to frame', (Daniels 2014: 338) . I live normally for forty years, and these are followed by a trillion years of unconsciousness at the end of which everything reverts to the state that it was in at the beginning of that trillion-year period. I then live normally for twenty years, and these are followed [by] a similarly undetectable trillion-year period of unconsciousness. I then live normally for ten years, and these in turn are followed by the same thing. And so on ad infinitum. Nowacki (2006: 84) rightly objects that no organism on remotely human physical lines could survive ever-briefer state-transitions or register ever-briefer experiences.
For any integer n, any 'Eleatic' spore god has arbitrarily-many past and future Pt increments shorter than 1/n seconds but all supposedly summing to a unified life. (If the increments don't unify, then there is no Pt-continuity and no spore god.) However, Nowacki (2006: 91) also queries Sorensen immortals on uncompelling metaphysical grounds, e.g. that infinite Pt accessible in finite Xt would allow impossible actually-infinite objects, such as circles of infinite radius:
It is metaphysically impossible for there to exist an actually infinite circle. … By parity of reasoning, at least half of the spore god's life is metaphysically impossible. Half of a metaphysically impossible life is no life at all. Lacking an extension of infinite personal time in both directions, Sorensen's thought experiment fails to support his desired conclusion.
Even setting aside Nowacki's metaphysical concerns, 5 Sorensen's (2005) 'Zeno' spore god faces a dilemma. Horn #1: if 'intermissions' disrupt Pt, traveller-identity fails, so the putative spore god is not one being at all but an infinite string of infinitely-many causally-disjoint beings whose Xt-to-Pt ratio gets ever-bigger the further away from now their history is traced. Horn #2: if only consciousness ceases during 'intermissions' but other traveller-processes (e.g. digestion, cellular division, etc.) continue, the putative spore god is merely an 'ordinary' immortal, (i.e. a nontime-traveller with Pt = Xt = ). However, just as relativity maps Lewisian TT without any ontologically-privileged 'time itself', general relativity (GR) models Sorensen spore gods without Zeno intermissions.
In special relativity's flat spacetime, compressing one frame's infinite duration into another's finite duration requires fatally unbounded accelerations, i.e. no spore gods: While  contrives to be alive throughout all of (infinite) external time,  still suffers death after finite personal time, i.e. ceases at point b after a journey of finite duration from a. Also,  (a fortiori) undergoes FTT, (Pt ≠ Xt; Xt > 0). Granted, in this unusual scenario, a and b are (respectively) absolutely earlier and later than any Xt point, but this is a mere artefact of the example in the illustration and not a general M-H feature An alternative 'spore god' arena that avoids this problem is Gödel's (1949) infinite 'rotating' BTT-supporting GR universe, wherein every point is M-H and two inertial observers on separate ( = ) timelike worldlines can have orthogonal time 7 For variously more sophisticated (and realistic) M-H scenarios, see Hogarth (1994) , Manchak (2010) , Wüthrich (2015) or Manchak and Roberts (2016) . An achieved theory of quantum gravity may yet banish any physically realistic M-H but 'let us proceed for now with the best available (classical) spacetime theory -GR', (Wüthrich 2015 (Wüthrich : 1990 . One could read M-H outcomes as a reductio of GR, but given GR's successes, this heroic course seems uncompelling.
Sorensen's spore gods seem metaphysically consistent, nomologically accessible within GR and have yet to be proven physically unrealisable. M-H worlds provide a consistent framework wherein the life of an observer with finite personal time can yet be distributed across all of the infinite external past and future. Hence, as Sorensen argues, being able to view all of (external) time need not proof you against mortality, Richmond@ed.ac.uk 
